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ABSTRACT Massive multiple-input multiple-output (MaMIMO) and cognitive radio networks (CRNs) are
two promising technologies for improving spectral efficiency of next-generation wireless communication
networks. In this paper, we investigate the problem of physical layer security in the networks that jointly
use both technologies, named MaMIMO-CRN. Specifically, to investigate the vulnerability of this network,
we design an optimized attacking scenario to MaMIMO-CRNs by a jammer. For having the most adversary
effect on the uplink transmission of the legitimate MaMIMO-CRN, we propose an efficient method for
power allocation of the jammer. The legitimate network consists of a training and a data transmission
phase, and both of these phases are attacked by the jammer using an optimized power split between them.
The resulting power allocation problem is non-convex. We thus propose three different efficient methods
for solving this problem, and we show that under some assumptions, a closed-form solution can also be
obtained. Our results show the vulnerability of the MaMIMO-CRN to an optimized jammer. It is also
shown that increasing the number of antennas at the legitimate network does not improve the security of
the network.
INDEX TERMS Massive MIMO, cognitive radio network, physical layer security, jamming, optimization,
power allocation, spectral efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
INRECENT years, the increasing demands for bandwidthand also inefficient usage of the frequency spectrum have
caused a severe shortage of this communication resource.
Cognitive radio networks (CRN) and massive multiple-input
multiple-output (MaMIMO) systems are two efficient solu-
tions to this problem [1]–[3]. The main goal of the CRN
is to efficiently utilize the scarce spectrum by sharing the
spectrum between different networks or by opportunisti-
cally using the unused frequency bands [1]. On the other
hand, in the MaMIMO systems, by using a large number
of antennas at the base stations (BSs), very high spectral
efficiency is achievable with low complexity transmitters
and receivers [3]. The combination of these two techniques;
which we refer to as MaMIMO-CRN; can boost these gains
and is considered as an efficient method for substantial
improvement in the wireless network performance in terms
of sum rate and spectral efficiency [4]–[10].
In [4], authors showed that the achievable sum rate of
the CRN increases if both primary and secondary BSs have
a large number of antennas. In addition, it is shown that
increasing the number of antenna at the secondary system
has the advantage of reducing the channel estimation error
and improving spectrum sensing procedure [5]. Three prob-
lems of resource allocation, interference mitigation, and
user selection in underlay MaMIMO-CRNs were studied
in [6]. Authors in [7] proposed an orthogonal pilot shar-
ing scheme at the training phase and formulated a power
allocation problem in a MaMIMO-CRN that provides the
maximum downlink sum rate in the secondary system. In [8],
selecting the maximum number of secondary users and sat-
isfying the required quality of service in a MaMIMO-CRN
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were investigated and a joint power allocation and sec-
ondary user selection algorithm was proposed. Authors in [9]
proposed a fair energy-efficient optimization problem in
MaMIMO-CRN. In [10], a power allocation problem for
pilot and data transmission phases with an energy effi-
ciency guarantee in the uplink of the MaMIMO-CRNs was
investigated. Moreover, a conventional method for combat-
ing these attacks is using encryption techniques that are
related to upper layers of the networks. However, physical
layer attacks can be efficiently mitigated by techniques per-
formed at that layer which are known as physical layer
security techniques [11]–[12]. Physical layer security has
been widely studied in the context of massive MIMO systems
as well as CRNs. Authors in [13] showed that MaMIMO
systems are secure against passive attacks but vulnerable
against active attacks. For example, if an active attacker
attacks the training phase of a MaMIMO network, it can
produce a pilot contamination effect that makes the chan-
nel estimation erroneous [14]. Furthermore, in [15], authors
studied the effect of eavesdropping in a multi-user MaMIMO
system, where there is one active eavesdropper per user. They
assumed that each eavesdropper obtains the pilot used by one
user and re-transmits it to disrupt the network quality. Then,
they proposed an uplink data aided double channel train-
ing scheme, which can accurately detect the presence of
an attacker and estimate the legitimate channels. Moreover,
authors in [16] studied physical layer security in the pres-
ence of a full-duplex active eavesdropper that uses jamming
attacks to improve its eavesdropping mode. Also, some issues
around the jamming attack such as jamming detection as
well as designing jamming resistant receivers were stud-
ied in [17]–[19]. It has been shown in the literature that a
smart jammer that has some pieces of information about the
MaMIMO network and accordingly uses them to optimize its
attack, can disrupt the performance of the legitimate network
considerably.
For instance, a worst-case smart jamming attack over
MIMO Gaussian channels was proposed in [20]. On the
other hand, in the CRNs, the problem of physical layer
security has been studied from two different aspects [21].
Spectrum sensing data falsification and primary user emu-
lation are some known attacks that destroy the spectrum
sensing phase [22]–[23]. On the other hand, jamming and
eavesdropping are the attacks that are performed at the cogni-
tive communications phase [24]–[25]. Despite many papers
published on the physical layer security of the MaMIMO
and CRN networks, related to MaMIMO-CRN the number
of papers is very limited. For example, in [26], providing
secure transmissions in the MaMIMO-CRNs against a pas-
sive multi-antenna eavesdropper with a pilot contamination
attack was studied. Likewise, intercepting the confidential
downlink transmissions of the MaMIMO-CRNs in the pres-
ence of an active eavesdropper was investigated in [27].
Moreover, in [28], a smart jamming attack on the uplink
transmission of the MaMIMO-CRN was designed to destruct
the performance of the secondary system.
In this paper, we investigate the maximum degradation
that a jammer can have on MaMIMO-CRNs. In fact, we
design and evaluate the most destructive strategy that a
smart jammer may adopt to attack a MaMIMO-CRN in
order to minimize spectral efficiency. In this scenario, the
jammer optimizes its transmission parameters to have the
worst adversary effect on the legitimate network. Particularly,
it optimally allocates its power between the training and
data transmission phases of the legitimate MaMIMO-CRN
network to minimize the spectral efficiency of the primary
network. This is an important problem and can be consid-
ered as the prerequisite step for developing countermeasure
algorithms that are then designed and used to protect the
MaMIMO-CRNs from illegal and destructive attacks.
We formulate the aforementioned power allocation
problem as a non-convex min− max optimization problem.
To solve this problem, we propose three different solution
methods. In the first method, we present a geometric pro-
gramming based solution. The second method presents a
closed-form solution for the problem which can be obtained
under specific realizations of the channel matrices. In the
third method, we utilize an epigraph form of the objec-
tive function and certain transformations of the constraint
functions to solve the problem. In addition, to illustrate and
compare the performance of the proposed solution methods,
our analytical and simulation results also show that a jammer
with optimized power allocation can efficiently degrade the
spectral efficiency of the MaMIMO-CRNs. In this case, even
increasing the number of antennas at the base stations cannot
improve the performance of the legitimate network. The aim
of this study is to help network designers to develop effi-
cient countermeasure techniques to secure MaMIMO-CRNs
against jamming attacks.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the system model. Problem formulation for the
jammer power allocation and the proposed solutions to the
optimization problem are given in the Sections III and IV,
respectively. Section V is devoted to the jammer optimization
in the presence of primary system optimal power. Numerical
results and conclusions are expressed in Section VI and
Section VII, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we consider the uplink transmis-
sion of a TDD multi-user MaMIMO-CRN using underlay
spectrum sharing. The network consists of a primary and a
secondary system. The primary system consists of K legiti-
mate single antenna users and a primary base station (PBS)
equipped with Np  1 antennas. Also, the secondary system
consists ofM legitimate single antenna users and a secondary
base station (SBS) with Ns  1 antennas. We denote the
ratio between Np and Ns by κ . There is also a jammer in
the area whose target is to destroy the communication of
the primary system. We denote the coherence time of the
channel by T in which the first η symbols are used for trans-
mitting η-tuple (K + M ≤ η ≤ T) mutual orthogonal pilot
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FIGURE 1. An MaMIMO-CRN consisting of a primary and a secondary system and a jammer that attacks the network.
sequences to estimate the channels and the rest of T is used
to transmit uplink data symbols.
At the beginning of each coherence interval, each legiti-
mate user transmits its assigned pilot. At the same time, the
jammer transmits its signal which is a combination of the
pilots in the training phase. Next, in the data transmission
phase, the jammer sends a noise-like signal simultaneously
with the users that send their data signals. For this goal,
the jammer needs some information including the transmis-
sion protocol (i.e., the timing of transmission) and the pilot
set. We assume that before attacking the legitimate system,
this information is provided to the jammer or the opti-
mized (smart) jammer by itself acquiring this information
during some coherence time before starting to attack the
network [17].
Furthermore, gk denotes the channel between the kth pri-
mary user and the PBS, i.e., the kth column of the channel
matrix between the primary users and the PBS. We denote
this matrix by G = HGDG1/2 in which HG ∈ CNp×K models
small scale fading of the primary channel with i.i.d elements
distributed as CN ∼ (0, 1). In addition, βgk is the kth diago-
nal element of the diagonal matrix DG ∈ RK×K that models
the path loss and shadowing effect between the kth primary
user and the PBS. Also, fm denotes the channel between the
mth secondary user and the SBS, i.e., the mth column of the
channel matrix between the secondary users and the SBS. We
denote this matrix by F = HFDF1/2 in which HF ∈ CNs×M
models the small scale fading of the secondary channel with
i.i.d elements distributed as CN ∼ (0, 1). Likewise, βfm is
the mth diagonal element of the diagonal matrix DF ∈ RM×M
that models the path loss and shadowing effect between the
mth secondary user and the SBS. Also, hp and hs are the
channel vectors between the single antenna jammer and
the PBS and the SBS, respectively. In addition, βhp and
βhs model the path loss and shadowing effect between the
jammer and PBS and SBS, respectively. Furthermore, vm
is the mth column of V ∈ CNp×M that denotes the channel
vector between the mth secondary user and the PBS where
βvm models the path loss and shadowing effect of it , and
uk is the kth column of U ∈ CNs×K that denotes the channel
vector between the kth primary user and the SBS where βuk
models the path loss and shadowing effect of this channel.
To formulate the destructive power allocation problem, we
consider the case that the jammer uses all information that
it obtained from the jamming phase.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND ASYMPTOTIC
SPECTRAL EFFICIENCY
In this section, we formulate the primary spectral efficiency
minimization problem, targeted by the jammer, and also ana-
lyze its asymptotic behavior. For this purpose, we consider
two phases of transmission, namely pilot transmission phase
and data transmission phase.
A. TRAINING (PILOT TRANSMISSION) PHASE
As we mentioned before, in order to increase the impact of
jamming on the primary system, we assume that the jammer
knows the set of pilot sequences of the primary system and
the transmission protocol. It should be noted that the jammer
has no information about the specific pilot sequence that is
assigned to each primary user at any time slot. The jammer
adopts a pilot contamination attack strategy, and to this end
sends a linear combination of the primary’s pilot sequences
in the training phase.
The pilot sequences of the primary and secondary systems
are denoted by two matrices of p ∈ Cη×K and s ∈ Cη×M ,
respectively. The kth column of p, φpk , denotes the
kth primary user’s pilot sequence and the mth column of
s, φsm , denotes the mth secondary user’s pilot sequence.
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The received signal at the PBS is
Ypt = √ηppGTp +
√
ηpsVTs + √pjhpφjT + N, (1)
where pp, ps and pj are the average transmission powers of
each primary user, secondary user and the jammer during
the training phase, respectively. The matrix N ∈ CNp×K is a
circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian receiver noise matrix
at the PBS with i.i.d. CN ∼ (0, 1) elements, and φj =∑η
k=1 φpk is the jammer’s pilot sequence.
Since (K+M ≤ η ≤ T), the MaMIMO-CRN can allocate
mutual orthogonal pilot sequences to K+M primary and sec-
ondary users. Therefore, in the MaMIMO-CRN the primary
system is effectively protected from the secondary system in
the training phase, i.e., φp
Hφp = IK,φsHφs = IM,φpHφs =
0. Thus, by using mutual orthogonal pilot sequences and
minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimation [29], the





















ηppβgk + pjβhp + 1
. (3)





= σ 2ĝkINp, (4)
where σ 2ĝk =
ηppβ2gk
ηppβgk+pjβhp+1 .
It should be noted that, due to K < η, PBS can use pilot(s)
utilized only by jammer to estimate the jammer’s channel
and obtain pjβhp [17]. After that, by using the pilot utilized
by each user and the information about pjβhp , each user’s
channel and ppβgk can be estimated. Then, by using the
closed-form solution of the MMSE estimator, ĝk is estimated
as Eq. (2) and consequently, σ 2ĝk is obtained from (4).
B. DATA TRANSMISSION PHASE
In this phase, the jammer sends its adversary signal at the
same time slot as the users send their data to the BSs. Let
ypd be the Np × 1 received vector at the PBS defined as
ypd =
√
qpGx + √qsVz + √qjhps+ n, (5)
where qp, qs and qj are the average transmission powers
of each primary user, each secondary user and the jam-
mer during data transmission phase, respectively. Moreover,
x ∈ CK×1 and z ∈ CM×1 denote the normalized symbol
vectors transmitted by the primary and secondary users,
respectively where E{xxH} = IK and E{zzH} = IM.
Furthermore, s denotes the normalized random symbol of
the jammer where E{|s|2} = 1. Also, the PBS receiver
noise n follows a zero mean circularly-symmetric complex
Gaussian distribution. Then, the received signal at the PBS
is decoded as
ydp = AHypd, (6)
where A ∈ CNp×K denotes the linear detection matrix at the
PBS which depends on the primary estimated channel. The












qsaHk vmzm + √qjaHk hps+ aHk n, (7)
where ak is the kth column of A. The first term in (7) is the
desired signal which is independent of the other terms. In
order to find a closed-form solution for spectral efficiency of
the kth primary user, we use the lower band for the spectral
efficiency as follows [30]










By using the maximum ratio combining (MRC) detector
at both the primary and secondary base stations, where the
detector matrix A is equal to matrix Ĝ which is estimated
in the training phase, the SINR of the kth primary user is
obtained as in (9), as shown at the bottom of this page. By
assuming that all channels are independent with Normal dis-
tributions and using some algebra, as stated in Appendix A,
the sum spectral efficiency of the primary system can be
written as (10), shown at the bottom of this page.
From the previous discussions, we have the following
result.
Corollary 1: When the number of antennas at the PBS,
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system is saturated due to the pilot contamination effect that




















This result shows that the MaMIMO-CRN is vulnerable to
a jammer that attacks the pilot phase. It is also observed
that increasing the number of antennas will not improve the
spectral efficiency performance.
To illustrate destructive effect of the jamming attack on the
performance of the MaMIMO-CRN, we propose an optimal
power allocation mechanism by the jammer.
IV. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION
In order to design the optimal jammer that has the highest
destruction on the performance of the primary system in the
training and data transmission phases, the jammer should
optimally divide its power budget between the training and
data transmission phases. To do so, the jammer solves a
power optimization problem to minimize the maximum sum
spectral efficiency of the primary system as follows. By
defining
ak = Npβ2gk ,

























































a2m = Nsβ2fm ,























k=1 βuk + 1
η
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we formulate the optimization problem as in (12) at the
bottom of this page.
In (12), C1 denotes the primary interference constraint, in
which Γ is the maximum allowable interference from the
secondary system on the primary system; C2 represents the
quality of service requirement of the secondary users which
is defined by their SINR. In addition, C3 is the energy bud-
get constraint of each secondary user; Esmax specifies the
maximum allowed total energy for each secondary user; C4
shows that sum of energies at the training and data trans-
mission phases is equal to the jammer’s maximum energy
budget and Q denotes the jammer’s maximum power budget.
The optimization problem in (12) is non-convex and can-
not be solved efficiently. In the following, we propose three
efficient methods to solve it. Firstly, we propose a geo-
metric programming (GP) model for the max part of (12)
for a given realization of the channel matrices, and then
use standard numerical methods to obtain the optimal value
of (12). To reduce the complexity, in the second proposed
method, we derived a closed-form solution for (12) under
some constraints on the channel gains. Finally, in the third
proposed method, by use of epigraph form of the objec-
tive function and some manipulations on the constraints, we
transform (12) to an equivalent convex optimization problem.
A. GEOMETRIC PROGRAMMING (GP) METHOD
In this solution, because of the multiplication of the variables,



























b2mpsqs + c2mps + d2mqs + e2m + f2mqjps + g2mqj
≥ γm,∀m : 1, . . . ,M
C3: ηps + (T − η)qs ≤ Esmax ,
C4: ηpj + (T − η)qj = QT,
C5: pj ≥ 0, ps ≥ 0, qj ≥ 0, qs ≥ 0 (12)
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Thus, for a given realization of the channel matrices and by






b+ cqs + dpj + eqj + f qspj + gqjpj
s.t. C1 : qs ≤ Γ.
(




C2 : a2psqs ≥ γ.(b2psqs
+ c2ps + d2qs + e2 + f2qjps + g2qj
)
,
C3 : ηps + (T − η)qs ≤ Esmax ,
C4 : ηpj + (T − η)qj = QT,
C5 : pj ≥ 0, ps ≥ 0, qj ≥ 0, qs ≥ 0. (13)
The objective function of (13) is not a posynomial function
and thus, is not in GP definitions [31]. Therefore, by using
the inverse of the objective function of (13), we obtain a
posynomial objective function. According to [32], inversing
the objective function of a min−max problem results in an
equivalent max − min problem. Therefore, our problem is





b+ cqs + dpj + eqj + f qspj + gqjpj
a
s.t. C1,C2,C3,C4,C5. (14)
Since the objective function and constraints of (14) are
posynomial functions w.r.t qs and ps, the min problem of (14)
is a GP optimization problem [31]. Then, to solve the max−
min problem (14), we find the solution of the min problem
of (14) for a finite set of pairs (pj, qj) satisfying pj, qj ≥
0 and ηpj + (T − η)qj = QT . Then, we choose the pair
which results in the maximum value for the solution of
the min problem of (14). Note that the aforementioned set
has a cardinality of N = QT
η.δ
, where δ is the step size of
discretization of the valid interval of pj, and therefore our
search is computationally affordable.
B. CLOSED-FORM SOLUTION
In this solution, we first study the max problem of (12).
It should be noted that the objective function of the max
problem just depends on qs. Thus, we want to obtain the
optimal value of qs. At first, according to Appendix B, we
demonstrate that the objective function of the max problem
in (12) has a non-increasing behavior. Then for simplicity,
we show the feasible set of the max problem in (12) in Fig. 2
(See Appendix C).
Under this feasible set and non-increasing behavior of the
objective function, we realize that the smallest qs in the
feasible set is the optimal value of qs. The smallest value of
qs is shown in Fig. 2 by a black dot. Therefore, we should find
the intersection of the boundary of C2 with largest horizontal
asymptotic with that of C3 to find the smallest qs.
The optimal values of qs and ps are obtained as func-
tions of qj (Appendix D). After that, by using C4, i.e.,
pj = QT−(T−η)qjη , we have a minimization problem with one



















































and  is the upper bound of qj (Appendix E). Finally, by
setting the derivative of the objective function of (15) equal
to zero, we can find optimal values of qj and pj. Also, a
closed-form solution for qj and pj can be obtained for a
given realization of the channel matrices (Appendix D).
C. CONVEX TRANSFORMATION (CT) METHOD
In this method, we try to find the convex model for the max
problem of (12). We know that for x > 0, log2(1 + 1x ) is a
convex and non-increasing function. Moreover, the combi-
nation of any non-increasing convex function with a linear
or concave function is always convex, and the summation of
convex functions on the same domain is also convex [31].
Therefore, the objective function in (12) is a convex func-
tion w.r.t qs. Due to the maximization of a convex function
is not a convex problem, we use the epigraph form of the
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≥ γm.
(
c2mps + d2mqs + e2m + f2mqjps + g2mqj
) ∀m,
C4 : ηps + (T − η)qs ≤ Esmax ,
C5 : ps, qs ≥ 0, (16)
where qk = bk + ckqs + dkpj + ekqj + fkqspj + gkqjpj and
pk = ak+qk. In (16), C1 and C3 are not convex sets [31]. To
convexify C1, we exploit the concavity of the negative rela-
tive entropy function, i.e., qk log
pk
qk
. To this end, we multiply
qk by the LHS of C1. Then, to have a valid constraint, we
should multiply the upper bound of qk by the RHS of C1.
Moreover, to convexify C3 we define x = psqs. Thus, we



























c2mps + d2mqs + e2m
+ f2mqjps + g2mqj
) ∀m,
C4 : ηps + (T − η)qs ≤ Esmax ,
C5 : x ≤ X,
C6 : qk ≤ ζk, pk ≤ ωk,




C8 : ps, qs ≥ 0, (17)
where X is the upper bound of x. Moreover, ζk and ωk are
the upper bounds of qk and pk, respectively.
Finally, to solve the min − max problem, we find the
solution of the max problem for a finite set of pairs (pj, qj)
satisfying pj, qj ≥ 0 and ηpj + (T − η)qj = QT . Then, we
choose the pair which results in the minimum value for the
solution of the max problem. Note that the aforementioned
set has a cardinality of N = QT
η.δ
, where δ is the step size of
discretization of the valid interval of pj, and therefore our
search is computationally affordable.
Remark 1: By assuming that the SNR value is calculated
for the three methods, the computational complexity can be
analyzed as follows. The first method consists of two min
and max parts. The min part of the problem is formulated
as a GP problem, which is solved using the interior point
method whose computational complexity is upper bounded
by O(n4L), where n is the number of variables and L is the
bit-length of the input data [33]. There are two variables ps
and qs, and therefore, computational complexity of the GP
part of the method is of order of a constant value. Moreover,
the max part of the problem is a finite search over a set of
cardinality of QT
η.δ
. Hence, the total computational complexity





The second method consists of min and max parts. The min-
max problem is solved in a closed form, and therefore, no
iteration is performed to find the solution. Hence, the com-
putational complexity is in the order of O(1). In the third
method, due to that the relative entropy function is a special
type logarithmic barrier functions, the interior point method
is applied for solving it [31]. Therefore, similar computa-
tional complexity with the first method, can be stated, except
that the number of variables according to problem (17) is
3K + 4. Hence, the computational complexity is at worst
O(n4 QT
η.δ
L) = O((3K + 4)4 QT
η.δ
L).
Moreover, computational complexity of the SINR,
presented in (9), depends on the number of antenna ele-
ments, which is in order of N2p , where Np is the number
of primary system antennas. Simulation results on the com-
putational complexity shows that the running time of the
third method is more than the two other methods. Also, the
second method is the fastest method.
V. JAMMER OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION USING
PRIMARY OPTIMAL POWERS
In previous sections, the jammer’s effect on the fixed pri-
mary’s powers was investigated. Here, we study a scenario
that both the primary and secondary users have optimal
power allocation. Therefore, in order to increase the destruc-
tive effect on the primary system, the jammer designs
its attack by considering the following assumption and
solves (18), as shown at the bottom of the next page, in
which Pp is the total transmit power of each primary user.
By using the solution similar to the CT method for a















































C4 : ηps + (T − η)qs ≤ Esmax ,
C5 : ηpp + (T − η)qp ≤ PpT,
C6 : x1 ≤ X1, x2 ≤ X2, x3 ≤ X3,
C7 : q ≤ ξ, p ≤ ω,
C8 : ps ≥ 0, qs ≥ 0, pp ≥ 0, qp ≥ 0, (19)
where x1 = ppqs, x2 = psqs and x3 = psqp. Their
upper bounds are denoted by X1, X2 and X3, respec-
tively. Here, ξ and ω are the upper bounds of q =
(βgk + pjβhpηpp + 1ηpp )(
∑K




m=1 βvm) + β2gk +
qj
qp
(βhpβgk + pjηpp (Np + 2)β2hp +
βhp
ηpp
) and p = Npβ2gk + q,
respectively.
Finally, we use numerical methods to obtain the optimal
powers of the system.
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TABLE 1. Simulation parameters.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, the performance of the proposed methods
is investigated. In particular, we consider a MaMIMO CRN
consisting of a primary system, a secondary system and a
jammer as depicted in Fig. 1. In this network, we evaluate
the sum spectral efficiency of the primary system in different
scenarios. The number of primary users is K = 20 and the
number of secondary users is M = 20. The coherence time
of the channel is T = 200 symbols. The parameters that we
use in this section are presented in Table 1. It should be
noted that we use CVX toolbox of MATLAB to solve the
GP and CT methods.
We define ρ and ζ as the ratio of the training phase energy
to the total energy for the primary users and the jammer,
respectively. Therefore, we have
pp = ρ.Pp.T
η
, qp = (1 − ρ).Pp.T
(T − η) (20a)
pj = ζ.Q.T
η
, qj = (1 − ζ ).Q.T
(T − η) . (20b)
1. Due to the variance of the noise is normalized to one, the power budget
of each primary user and the jammer, denoted by Pp and Q, respectively
is measured in dB and, therefore, dimensionless.
FIGURE 3. Sum spectral efficiency of the primary system versus the number of
primary base station antennas (NP ) for the proposed methods (with Pp = 5 dB and
ρ = 0.6).
Fig. 3 compares the sum spectral efficiency of the primary
system versus the number of antennas at the PBS for three
different solution methods for the optimization problem (12).
It is seen that in all the number of antennas, the performance
of the three methods is almost the same. Thus, the three
proposed methods are efficient and have the same results,
hence, we can use the most rapid one to solve Eq. (12). It
should be noted that since we assume κ = 1, the number of
antennas at the SBS is equal to the number of antennas at
the PBS.
Fig. 4 shows the effect of the value of ζ that obtained
from three proposed solution methods on the sum spec-
tral efficiency of the primary system versus the number of
antennas at the PBS. As shown in Fig. 4, the sum spectral
efficiency of the primary system for the obtained ζ , i.e.,
ζ = 0.5, has the lowest value. To give an intuition, consider
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) ≥ γm ∀m : 1, . . . .M,
C3: ηps + (T − η)qs ≤ Esmax ,
C4: ηpp + (T − η)qp ≤ PpT,
C5: ηpj + (T − η)qj = QT,
C6: pj ≥ 0, ps ≥ 0, qj ≥ 0, qs ≥ 0, pp ≥ 0, qp,≥ 0 (18)
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FIGURE 4. Sum spectral efficiency of the primary system versus the number of
primary base station antennas (Np ) in different values of energy allocation ratio of the
jammer ζ (with Pp = 5 dB and ρ = 0.6).
FIGURE 5. Sum spectral efficiency of the primary system versus the number of
primary base station antennas (Np ) in different power budgets (Pp ) of each primary
user (with ρ = 0.2).
of the problem 12, and also assume that the coefficients
dk, ek, and gk are equal to 1. Then, the maximum of the
denominator would be obtained for the equal value of pj
and qj, or equivalently ζ = 0.5. This result means that we
have obtained the optimal power allocation of the jammer
to degrade most the MaMIMO-CRN performance.
Fig. 5 illustrates the sum spectral efficiency of the primary
system versus the number of antennas at the PBS in differ-
ent power budgets (Pp) of each primary user. This figure
validates the result of equation (11), which states that with
the large number of Np, the sum spectral efficiency of the
primary is saturated. Also, it is deduced from Fig. 5 that the
proposed system model with a lower value of Pp is more
vulnerable to the jamming attack.
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 indicate the effect of the jammer’s power
budget and the number of the PBS antennas on the energy
allocation ratio of the jammer, respectively. As shown in
FIGURE 6. Optimal energy allocation ratio of the jammer (ζ ) versus the jammer’s
power budget (Q) in different values of energy allocation ratio of the primary system
(ρ) (with Pp = 5 dB and Np = Ns = 150).
FIGURE 7. Optimal energy allocation ratio of the jammer (ζ ) versus the number of
primary base station antennas (Np ) in different values of energy allocation ratio of the
primary system (ρ) (with Pp = 5 dB).
Fig. 6, by increasing the jammer’s power budget in differ-
ent ρ, ζ approximately tends to 0.5. Thus, the jammer can
allocate equal energy to each uplink transmission phase to
destroy the MaMIMO-CRN. Moreover, it is seen from Fig. 6
that by increasing the energy allocation ratio of the primary
system (ρ), the optimal energy allocation ratio of the jammer
(ζ ) decreases. This is intuitive, because, as much as primary
system pay more energy in the data transmission phase, it
is more beneficial to the jammer to transmit more energy in
the other phase, i.e., training phase.
Similar results are obtained from Fig. 7, in the case that the
number of the PBS antennas varies and Q is fixed. Thus, in a
large value of Q or Np, the jammer has the vulnerable effect
very easily. Therefore, the jammer does not need to know
any information about the primary and secondary systems
to solve problem (12) to have a destructive attack and just
should allocate equal energy to each uplink transmission
phase to degrade the performance of the MaMIMO-CRN.
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FIGURE 8. Sum spectral efficiency of the primary system versus the number of
primary base station antennas (Np ) with and without optimal powers of primary users
(with ρ = 0.6).
Fig. 8 shows the sum spectral efficiency of the primary
system versus the number of primary base station anten-
nas with and without the optimal powers of primary users.
According to Fig. 8, when the jammer attacks the system
with the optimal powers of the primary and secondary
systems, the destructive effect of the jammer increases.
Also, according to the proposed attack scenario, a jam-
mer has a more destructive effect if it attacks the optimum
MaMIMO-CRN.
VII. CONCLUSION
We studied the sum spectral efficiency behavior of a multi-
user MaMIMO-CRN in the presence of a jammer. The
pilot contamination within the training phase of the primary
system was due to a jammer, which could optimally allocate
its power budget to attack the training and data transmission
phases of the primary system. We showed that even with a
large number of antennas at the primary and secondary base
stations, the jammer could destruct the sum spectral effi-
ciency of the primary system. Moreover, it is illustrated that
even in the case of a large number of antennas at both the
primary and secondary base stations, for a large amount of
the jammer’s power budget, the jammer requires no process
to allocate its power budget to optimally attack each uplink
transmission phase.
APPENDIX A
Here we simplify the numerator and denominator of the right
hand side (RHS) of the equation (9).
Assume that all channels are independent and with zero
mean Normal distributions . Now, by considering (2), the






















= BNpβgk . (21)



















































where i = k, Tr[ · ] calculates the trace of a matrix, and the
equalities a, b, c and d are due to the trace properties and













































where the equality g can be verified by considering (2) and
the independence of the channels. The equality E{||gk||4} =
Np(Np + 2)β2gk can be easily verified due to Normal distribu-
tion of gk. Moreover, E{hHp gkgHk hp} and E{φTpkNHgkgHk Nφ∗pk}
are simplified using the trace trick and independence of
the random variables, similar to (21). Finally, the remaining
terms of the denominator are calculated in the same man-














































We know that the derivative of the combination of two
functions is calculated as follows
(f (g(x)))′ = f ′(g(x))g′(x). (24)
In the spectral efficiency that we calculated, f (x) =
log2(1 + 1x ) that for x > 0 is a non-increasing function [14],
and g(x) = (bk + ckqs + dkpj + ekqj + fkqspj + gkqjpj)/ak
is an increasing function w.r.t qs. Therefore, the spectral
efficiency of each primary user is a non-increasing function
w.r.t qs. Also, according to the rule that (f +g+h+· · · )′ =
f ′ + g′ + h′ + · · · , the sum spectral efficiency of the primary
system is a non-increasing function as qs is increasing.
APPENDIX C













) + e2m + g2mqj
]
, (25)
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since the powers and other terms in (25) are positive, the
right hand side of (25) is positive and therefore the left hand




) − γmd2m ≥ 0. (26)
Since ps must always be positive, the only allowed mode of


















The inequality (28) is a homogeneous function, therefore,
to plot (28) we should calculate the horizontal and vertical
asymptotics of it. These asymptotics in our problem are











It should be noted that to obtain the intersection of C2 with
C1 and C3, we should find the largest horizontal asymptotic
of C2 for all m : 1, . . . ,M.
Also, calculating the derivative of the fraction in (28)
shows that its derivative is always negative. Therefore, the
homogeneous function in (28) is always decreasing.
APPENDIX D
By finding the intersection of the boundary of C3 with that
of C2 with largest horizontal asymptotic, the optimal value
of ps is obtained as
p∗s =

















which is defined as
β1m = (T − η)2f 22m,
β2m = 2c2mf2m(T − η)2 + f2mα2m − 4Amg2m(T − η),
β3m = (T − η)2c22m + α21m + c2mα2m
− 4Am
(
Esmaxd2m + e2m(T − η)
)
,












By using q∗s and p∗s and setting the derivative of the objec-
tive function in (15) equal to zero for a given realization of
the channel matrices, we have a quartic equation as follows
A1q
4
j + B1qj3 + C1q2j + D1qj + E1 = 0, (31)
where






















































































Γ2 = af f2(T − η)
A
+ a2g(T − η)
η
.
We now use the following solution to solve a quartic equation
as ax4 + bx3 + cx2 + dx+ e = 0. The roots of this equation
are obtained as





−4s2 − 2p+ q
s
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0 = C2 − 3bd + 12ae,
1 = 2C3 − 9bcd + 27b2e+ 27ad2 − 72ace.
Therefore, by using (32) and 0 ≤ qj ≤  we find the optimal
value of qj.
APPENDIX E
In order to maintain the feasibility of the optimization
problem (12), the horizontal asymptotic obtained from (29)

















Considering qt = QT−(T−η)qdη , (33) can be rearranged to
obtain an upper bound for qd. The intersection of the afore-
mentioned upper bound and the upper bound qd ≤ QTT−η
obtained from the conditions C4 and C5, an upper bound
for qd is obtained which is denoted by .
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